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Abstract
We propose Absum, which is a regularization method for im-
proving adversarial robustness of convolutional neural net-
works (CNNs). Although CNNs can accurately recognize im-
ages, recent studies have shown that the convolution oper-
ations in CNNs commonly have structural sensitivity to spe-
cific noise composed of Fourier basis functions. By exploiting
this sensitivity, they proposed a simple black-box adversarial
attack: Single Fourier attack. To reduce structural sensitiv-
ity, we can use regularization of convolution filter weights
since the sensitivity of linear transform can be assessed by
the norm of the weights. However, standard regularization
methods can prevent minimization of the loss function be-
cause they impose a tight constraint for obtaining high ro-
bustness. To solve this problem, Absum imposes a loose con-
straint; it penalizes the absolute values of the summation of
the parameters in the convolution layers. Absum can improve
robustness against single Fourier attack while being as simple
and efficient as standard regularization methods (e.g., weight
decay and L1 regularization). Our experiments demonstrate
that Absum improves robustness against single Fourier attack
more than standard regularization methods. Furthermore, we
reveal that robust CNNs with Absum are more robust against
transferred attacks due to decreasing the common sensitivity
and against high-frequency noise than standard regularization
methods. We also reveal that Absum can improve robustness
against gradient-based attacks (projected gradient descent)
when used with adversarial training.
Introduction
Deep neural networks have achieved great success in many
applications, e.g., image recognition (He et al. 2016) and
machine translation (Vaswani et al. 2017). Specifically,
CNNs and rectified linear units (ReLUs) have resulted in
breakthroughs in image recognition (LeCun et al. 1989;
Nair and Hinton 2010) and are de facto standards for im-
age recognition and other applications (He et al. 2016;
Radford, Metz, and Chintala 2016). Though CNNs can clas-
sify image data as accurately as humans, they are sensitive
to small perturbations of inputs, i.e., injecting imperceptible
perturbations can make deep models misclassify image data.
Such attacks are called adversarial attacks and the perturbed
inputs are called adversarial examples (Szegedy et al. 2013).
We can roughly divide adversarial attacks into two types;
white-box attacks, which use the information of target mod-
els (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014; Madry et al.
2018; Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2016), and
black-box attacks, which do not require the information of
target models (Papernot, McDaniel, and Goodfellow 2016;
Chen et al. 2017; Papernot et al. 2017). Black-box attacks,
rather than white-box attacks, can threaten online deep-
learning services since it is difficult to access the target
models in online deep-learning applications (Papernot et al.
2017; Yuan et al. 2019).
Most black-box attacks are transferred attacks, which are
generated as white-box attacks for substitute models instead
of the target model (Papernot, McDaniel, and Goodfellow
2016). This implies that deep models have common sensitiv-
ity against specific perturbations. In fact, Tsuzuku and Sato
(2019) have recently shown that CNNs have the structural
sensitivity from the perspective that convolution can be re-
garded as the product of the circulant matrix and proposed
single Fourier attack (SFA).1 Fourier basis functions create
singular vectors of circulant matrices, and SFA uses these
singular vectors since the dominant singular vector can be
the worst noise for a matrix-vector product. Although SFA is
a very simple attack composed of a single-frequency compo-
nent, it is universal adversarial perturbations for CNNs, i.e.,
it can decrease the classification accuracy of various CNN-
based models without using the information about the model
parameters and without depending on input images. To the
best of our knowledge, an effective defense method against
SFA has not been proposed. Therefore, such a method is nec-
essary.
To defend CNNs against SFA, we first reveal that the
spectral norm constraint (Sedghi, Gupta, and Long 2019)
(hereinafter, we call it SNC) can reduce the structural sen-
sitivity. While SNC was proposed to improve generalization
performance, it can improve robustness in the Fourier do-
main since singular values of convolution layers correspond
to the magnitude of the frequency response. However, SNC
is not so practical since it requires high computational cost
to compute the spectral norm (the largest singular value).
We then develop Absum; an efficient regularization method
1Yin et al. (2019) concurrently proposed the same attack.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
08
83
0v
1 
 [s
tat
.M
L]
  1
9 S
ep
 20
19
for reducing the structural sensitivity of CNNs. Instead of
the spectral norm, we use the induced ∞-norm (L∞ oper-
ator norm) since it is the upper bound of the spectral norm
for convolution. However, a constraint of the induced ∞-
norm, which is equivalent to L1 regularization, requires a
tight constraint for robustness, which prevents minimization
of the loss function. This is because the induced ∞-norm
is a conservative measure; it handles the effects of negative
inputs even though inputs always have positive values after
ReLU activations. To improve robustness without prevent-
ing the loss minimization, Absum relaxes the induced ∞-
norm by penalizing the absolute values of the summations
of weights instead of elements on the basis that input vec-
tors always have positive elements. Absum is as simple as
standard regularization methods such as weight decay, but
it can reduce sensitivity to SFA. We provide the proximal
operator to minimize loss functions with Absum.
Image recognition experiments on MNIST, Fashion-
MNIST (FMNIST), CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and SVHN
demonstrate that Absum and SNC outperform L1 and L2
regularization methods in terms of improving robustness
against SFA, and the computation time of Absum is about
one-tenth that of SNC. In the additional empirical evalua-
tion, we reveal that robust CNNs against SFA can be robust
against transferred attacks by using white-box attacks (pro-
jected gradient descent: PGD (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and
Bengio 2016; Madry et al. 2018)). This implies that sensitiv-
ity to SFA is one of the causes of the transferability of adver-
sarial attacks. As a further investigation of Absum and SNC,
we reveal that adversarial perturbations for CNNs trained
with Absum and SNC have little high-frequency compo-
nents, i.e., these CNNs are robust against high-frequency
noise. Furthermore, our experiments show that Absum is ef-
fective against PGD when using adversarial training.
The following are main contributions of this paper:
• We show that SNC improves robustness against SFA.
SNC was proposed to improve generalization perfor-
mance, but effectiveness in robustness against SFA had
not been evaluated.
• We propose Absum and its proximal operator. Absum im-
proves robustness against SFA as well as SNC while its
computational cost is lower than that of SNC.
• In the futher empirical evaluation, Absum and SNC can
also improve robustness against other black-box attacks
(transferred attacks and High-Frequency attacks (Wang
et al. 2019)). In addition, Absum can improve robustness
against PGD when used with adversarial training.
Preliminaries
CNNs, ReLUs and Circulant Matrix
In this section, we outline CNNs, ReLUs, and a circulant
matrix for convolution operation. LetX∈Rn×n be an input
map, Y ∈ Rn×n be an output map, and K ∈ Rn×n be a
filter matrix such that K = [k1,k2, . . . ,kn]T , where ki =
[ki,1, ki,2 . . . , ki,n]
T ∈ Rn. The output of the convolution
operation Y =K ∗X becomes
Yl,m =
∑n
p=1
∑n
q=1 kp,qXl+p−1,m+q−1. (1)
Note that when the filter size is h×h and h < n, we can em-
bed it in the n×n matrixK by padding with zeros (Sedghi,
Gupta, and Long 2019). After the convolution, we usually
use ReLU activations as the following function:
ReLU(x) = max(x, 0). (2)
Typical model architectures use a combination of convolu-
tion and ReLU. For example, a standard block of ResNet
(He et al. 2016) is composed as
h(X)=ReLU(X+BN(K(2)∗ReLU(BN(K(1)∗X)))), (3)
whereBN is batch normalization (Ioffe and Szegedy 2015).
Since SFA and Absum are based on a circulant matrix for
convolution operation, we show that the convolution can be
expressed as a product of a vector and doubly block circu-
lant matrix. Let x = vec(X) and y = vec(Y ) be vectors
obtained by stacking the columns ofX and Y , respectively.
ConvolutionK ∗X can be written as
y = Ax, (4)
whereA ∈ Rn2×n2 is the following matrix:
A=

c(k1) c(k2) . . . c(kn)
c(kn) c(k1) . . . c(kn−1)
...
...
c(k2) c(k3) . . . c(k1)
, c(ki) =

ki,1, ki,2, . . . , ki,n
ki,n, ki,1, . . . , ki,n−1
...
...
ki,2, ki,3, . . . , ki,1
.
(5)
The coefficients ki,j are cyclically shifted in c(ki)∈Rn×n,
and block matrices c(ki) are cyclically shifted in A. There-
fore,A is called a doubly block circulant matrix.
Single Fourier Attack
As mentioned above, convolution can be written by a doubly
block circulant matrix. Such matrices always have eigenvec-
tors Q = 1nF ⊗F , where elements of F are composed of
the Fourier basis Fl,m = exp(−j 2pin lm), where j =
√−1
(Jain 1989; Sedghi, Gupta, and Long 2019; Tsuzuku and
Sato 2019), and singular vectors are also composed of F⊗F
even if we stack convolution layers (Tsuzuku and Sato 2019;
Karner, Schneid, and Ueberhuber 2003). From these charac-
teristics, Tsuzuku and Sato (2019) proposed SFA. The per-
turbed input image Xˆ by SFA is
Xˆ=X+ε((1+j)(F )l⊗(F )m+(1−j)(F )n−l⊗(F )n−m), (6)
where (F )l ∈ Rn is the l-th column vector of F , X is
an input image, and ε is magnitude of the attack. SFA
is composed of (F )l ⊗ (F )m and its complex conjugate
(F )n−l⊗ (F )n−m to create a perturbation that has real val-
ues since inputs of CNNs are assumed to be real values. The
l and m are hyperparameters such that l = 0, 1, . . . , n −
1,m=0, 1, . . . , n−1. Figure 1 shows examples of CIFAR10
perturbed by SFA. We can see that (l,m) determines a
space-frequency of the noise. Note that stacked convolution
layers without activation functions (e.g., A(2)A(1)x) also
have singular vectors composed of Fourier basis functions.
Even though we use nonlinear activation functions, many
model architectures (e.g., WideResNet, DenseNet-BC, and
GoogLeNet) are sensitive to SFA (Tsuzuku and Sato 2019).
m = 0 m = 8 m = 16 m = 24
l = 0
l = 8
m = 0 m = 8 m = 16 m = 24
l = 16
l = 24
Figure 1: Examples perturbed by SFA of (l,m) =
(0, 0), (0, 8), . . . , (24, 16), (24, 24)
Vulnerability of CNNs in Frequency Domain
Sensitivity to SFA can be regarded as sensitivity to a single-
frequency noise (Yin et al. 2019). To understand the vul-
nerability of CNNs, several studies focused on sensitiv-
ity of CNNs in the frequency domain (Yin et al. 2019;
Wang et al. 2019; Das et al. 2018; Liu et al. 2019). These
studies point out that sensitivity to high-frequency com-
ponents in images is one of the causes of adversarial at-
tacks since human visual systems are not sensitive to high-
frequency components unlike CNNs. In fact, several studies
show that CNNs are sensitive to high-frequency noise (Jo
and Bengio 2017; Wang et al. 2019; Yin et al. 2019; Das et
al. 2018). Jo and Bengio (2017) and Wang et al. (2019) show
that CNNs misclassify images processed by low-pass filters
and Wang et al. (2019) call this a High-Frequency attack,
which is a simple black-box adversarial attack. There is a
hypothesis that robust CNNs against high-frequency noise
are also robust against adversarial attacks (Wang et al. 2019;
Yin et al. 2019). Note that Wang et al. (2019) claimed that
sensitivity in the high-frequency domain contributes to high
performance on clean data; thus, there is a trade-off.
Related Work
Adversarial attacks can be transferred to other models and
transferred white-box attacks become adversarial black-box
attacks (Papernot et al. 2017). These attacks can be defended
against by adversarial training, which is a promising defense
method (Papernot et al. 2017; Madry et al. 2018). However,
the computational cost of adversarial training is larger than
naive training. Note that Absum can be used with adver-
sarial training. Several studies proposed black-box attacks
using queries to ask the target model about predicted la-
bels of given data, but these attacks might still be imprac-
tical since they require many queries (Chen et al. 2017;
Brendel, Rauber, and Bethge 2018; Ilyas et al. 2018). On
the other hand, SFA only uses the information that the target
model is composed of CNNs and is more practical.
Our method simply penalizes parameters in a similar
manner compared to standard regularization methods. As
standard regularization methods, L2 regularization (weight
decay) is commonly used for improving generalization per-
formance due to its simplicity. L1 regularization is also used
since it induces sparsity (Goodfellow, Bengio, and Courville
2016). In addition, spectral norm (induced 2-norm) reg-
ularization can also improve generalization performance
(Yoshida and Miyato 2017; Sedghi, Gupta, and Long 2019).
Due to space limitations, we outline other studies less rele-
vant than the above studies in the appendix.
Defense Methods against SFA
In this section, we first show that SNC can improve robust-
ness against SFA. Since SNC has a large time complexity,
we next discuss whether standard regularizations can be al-
ternatives. Finally, we discuss Absum and its proximal oper-
ator, which is an efficient defense method against SFA.
Spectral Norm Constraint
SFA is based on the following properties of linear transform:
σ(A)=max||x||2=1 ||Ax||2, v=arg max||x||2=1 ||Ax||2, (7)
where σ is the largest singular value (spectral norm or in-
duced 2-norm), and v is the right singular vector correspond-
ing to σ. Equation (7) shows that the singular vector can
be the worst noise for linear transform, and SFA uses the
singular vectors for convolutional layers. Since the spectral
norm determines the impact of SFA, we can reduce sensi-
tivity to SFA by constraining the spectral norm. The con-
straint of the spectral norm for CNNs (i.e., SNC) (Sedghi,
Gupta, and Long 2019; Gouk et al. 2018) was proposed in
the context of improving generalization performance. SNC
clips σ if it exceeds a preset threshold; thus, it can directly
control sensitivity to a single-frequency perturbation. How-
ever, the constraints of the exact spectral norm2 of A incurs
large computation cost; the O(n2c2(c + log(n))) time for
each convolution when input size is n×n, and the numbers
of input and output channels are c even if we use the efficient
spectral norm constraints (Sedghi, Gupta, and Long 2019).
SNC can be infeasible when the size of inputs increases.
Standard Regularizations fail to Defend
Instead of using the spectral norm, we can assess the effect
of the perturbation for linear transform by using
max||x||∞=1 ||Ax||∞. (8)
Equation (8) is the induced ∞-norm ||A||∞, and we have
||A||2 ≤ ||A||∞ for convolution (it is proved in the ap-
pendix). This norm is calculated as:
||A||∞ = maxl
∑
m |Al,m|. (9)
Substituting eq. (5) for eq. (9), we have
maxl
∑
m |Al,m| =
∑
m
∑
l |kl,m|. (10)
Thus, the penalty of the induced∞-norm can be L1 regular-
ization (Gouk et al. 2018). Therefore, L1 regularization can
improve robustness. However, the induced∞-norm is a con-
servative measure of robustness (Szegedy et al. 2013); the
highly weightedL1 regularization for robustness can prevent
minimization of the loss function. Figure 2 shows the test
accuracy of models, which is trained with L1 regularization,
on data perturbed by SFA against the regularization weight
λ. In this figure, the robust accuracy against SFA increases
along with the regularization weight, i.e., the robustness in-
creases according to the regularization weight. However, the
2The spectral norm in spectral norm regularization (Yoshida
and Miyato 2017) is often quite different from that of A (Sedghi,
Gupta, and Long 2019; Gouk et al. 2018).
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Figure 2: Accuracy of models trained with L1 regularization
on test dataset perturbed by SFA vs regularization weight.
l,m of SFA are tuned to minimize accuracy for each λ.
Figure 3: Comparison of search spaces of Absum: |k1 + k2|
(blue) and L1 regularization: |k1|+ |k2| (red) where f(θ) is
loss function. We have {k|∑i |ki| ≤ c} ⊆ {k| |∑i ki| ≤
c} for any constant c ≥ 0 from triangle inequality.
accuracy significantly decreases when the weight exceeds a
certain point. This is because training with high weighted
L1 regularization does not have sufficient search space to
minimize the loss function. Note that weight decay can also
penalize the spectral norm (in the appendix) and imposes
tight regularization, as discussed in the experiments section.
Therefore, we need a weak regularization method such that
models become both highly robust and accurate.
Absum: Simple and Weak Regularization
To develop a weak regularization method, we reconsider
the optimization problem of eq. (8). The maximum point
(eq. (9)) is achieved by xm = sign(Al′,m), where l′ =
arg maxl
∑
m|Al,m|, i.e., xm= 1 if Al′,m>0 and xm=−1
if Al′,m<0. However, we should consider the sign of input
in practice because we usually use ReLUs as activation func-
tions. As described in eq. (3), ReLUs are used before con-
volution asK ∗ReLU(·). Thus, x cannot have negative el-
ements, i.e., xm cannot be sign(Al′,m) when sign(Al′,m)=
−1. Therefore, the induced∞-norm can overestimate sensi-
tivity to the perturbation. From this insight, we consider the
norm ofAx when x=1 instead of eq. (8)
||A1||∞ = maxl |
∑
mAl,m| = |
∑
m
∑
l kl,m|. (11)
For robustness, we use this value as the regularization term.
We call our method Absum since this value is the absolute
value of the summation of the filter coefficients.
The objective function of training with Absum is
minθ
1
N
∑N
p=1 f(θ,Xp,Yp) + λ
∑L
i=1 g(K
(i)), (12)
g(K(i)) = |∑nm=1∑nl=1 k(i)l,m|,
where f(·) is a loss function,Xp and Yp are the p-th training
image and label, respectively, θ is the parameter vector in-
cluding K(i) in the model, and λ is a regularization weight.
The K(i) is the filter matrix of the i-th convolution, and L
is the number of convolution filters.3 Figure 3 shows search
spaces of Absum (blue) andL1 regularization (red) when we
have two parameters. The constraint of Absum is looser than
L1 regularization because a large element k
(i)
l,m  0 is al-
lowed if a small element k(i)l′,m′0 satisfies |k(i)l,m|= |k(i)l′,m′ |.
Even if |∑l∑mkl,m|= 0, the search space of Absum is a
n2−1 dimensional space {K|K ∈ Rn×n,∑l∑mkl,m =
0} while that of L1 regularization is a point K = O if∑
l
∑
m|kl,m|= 0. Note that the search space of weight de-
cay is also the point K = O when ||K||F = 0. Therefore,
the loss function with Absum can be lower than that with L1
regularization and weight decay if we use a large λ.
Note that when the filter size is h×h and h<n, we only
need to compute |∑hm=1∑hl=1kl,m| since zeros padded in
K do not affect eq. (12) (hereafter, we use h instead of n).
Proximal Operator for Absum
Since g(K) is not differentiable at
∑
l
∑
mkl,m=0, the gra-
dient method might not be effective for minimizing eq. (12).
To minimize eq. (12), we use a proximal gradient method,
which can minimize a differentiable loss function with a
non-differentiable regularization term (Parikh, Boyd, and
others 2014). We now introduce proximal operator for Ab-
sum. For clarity, let k¯ be k¯= vec(K) = [kT0 , . . . ,k
T
h−1]
T ∈
Rh
2
. The proximal operator for λg(k¯) is
proxλg(k¯)=

k¯+λ1 if
∑
l
∑
m kl,m<−h2λ,
k¯−
∑
l
∑
mkl,m
h2 1 if − h2λ≤
∑
l
∑
m kl,m≤h2λ,
k¯−λ1 if∑l∑m kl,m>h2λ. (13)
The following lemmas show that eq. (13) is the proximal
operator for Absum:
Lemma 1. If k¯ = [k¯1, . . . , k¯n¯]T ∈ Rn¯, g(k¯) = |
∑
i k¯i| is
a convex function.
Lemma 2. If k¯ = [k¯1, . . . , k¯n¯]T ∈ Rn¯, u ∈ Rn¯ and
g(k¯) = |∑i k¯i|, we have
proxλg(k¯)=arg minu
1
2 ||u− k¯||22 + λ|
∑
i ui| (14)
=

k¯ + λ1 if
∑
i k¯i < −n¯λ,
k¯ −
∑
i k¯i
n¯ 1 if − n¯λ ≤
∑
i k¯i ≤ n¯λ,
k¯ − λ1 if ∑i k¯i > n¯λ. (15)
The proofs of lemmas are provided in the appendix.
Lemma 1 shows that we can use the proximal gradient
method, and Lemma 2 shows that the proximal operator of
Absum can be obtained as the closed-form of eq. (15). By
using the proximal operator after stochastic gradient descent
(SGD), we update the i-th convolution filter:
k¯(i)←proxηλg(k¯(i)−η∇k¯(i) 1B
∑B
b=1 f(θ,Xb,Yb)) (16)
3We penalize the filter matrix for each channel. If one convolu-
tion layer has c1 output channels and c2 input channels, the regu-
larization term becomes λ
∑c1
l=1
∑c2
m=1 g(K
(l+(m−1)c1)).
where η is a learning rate, andB is a minibatch size. We pro-
vide the pseudocode of the whole training in the appendix.
We can compute the proximal operator in O(h2) time for
each convolution when the filter size is h × h because we
only need to compute the summation of parameters and el-
ementwise operations. We can also compute weight decay
and L1 regularization in O(h2) since the number of pa-
rameters in each convolution is h2. Therefore, the order of
computational complexity of Absum is the same as those
of weight decay and L1 regularization. When we have c in-
put channels and c output channels, the computational costs
of Absum, weight decay, and L1 regularization are O(c2h2)
and less than that of SNCO(c2n2(c+log(n))) where n ≥ h.
Note that the loss function f for training deep neural net-
works is usually non-convex while g(K) is convex. Several
studies investigate the proximal gradient method when f is
non-convex (Li and Lin 2015), and Wen et al. (2016) use the
proximal gradient method for inducing sparse structures in
deep learning. We observed that the algorithm of Absum can
find a good parameter point during the experiments.
Experiments
We discuss the evaluation of the effectiveness of SNC and
Absum in improving robustness against SFA. Next, we show
that Absum is more efficient than SNC especially when
the size of input images and models are large. Finally, as
the further investigation, we discuss the evaluation of the
performance of Absum and SNC in terms of robustness
against transferred attacks, vulnerability in frequency do-
main, and robustness against PGD when used with adversar-
ial training. To evaluate effectiveness, we conducted experi-
ments of image recognition on MNIST (LeCun et al. 1998),
FMNIST (Xiao, Rasul, and Vollgraf 2017), CIFAR10, CI-
FAR100 (Krizhevsky and Hinton 2009), and SVHN (Netzer
et al. 2011). We compared Absum and SNC with standard
regularizations (weight decay (WD) and L1 regularization).
Experimental Conditions
We provide details of the experimental conditions in the
appendix. In all experiments, we selected the best regu-
larization weight from among [101, 100, . . . , 10−7] for Ab-
sum and standard regularization methods, and the best spec-
tral norm σ from among [0.01, 0.1, 0.5, 1.0, 10] for SNC. In
SNC, we clipped σ once in 100 iterations due to the large
computational cost. For MNIST and FMNIST, we stacked
two convolutional layers and two fully connected layers
and used ReLUs as activation functions. For CIFAR10, CI-
FAR100, and SVHN, the model architecture was ResNet-18
(He et al. 2016). We used SFA with l,m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 27}
and ε = 80/255 on MNIST and FMNIST, and l,m ∈
{0, 1, . . . , 31} and ε=10/255 on CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and
SVHN.
In addition, we used PGD to evaluate robustness against
transferred attacks and white-box attacks since PGD is a so-
phisticated white-box attack. In addition to naive training,
we evaluated robustness against PGD when we used ad-
versarial training (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016;
Madry et al. 2018) with each method because Absum can
be used with it due to its simplicity. Model architectures
were the same as in the experiments involving SFA. The hy-
perparameter settings for PGD were based on (Madry et al.
2018). The L∞ norm of the perturbation ε was set to ε=0.3
for MNIST and FMNIST and ε= 8/255 for CIFAR10, CI-
FAR100, and SVHN at training time. For PGD, we updated
the perturbation for 40 iterations with a step size of 0.01 on
MNIST and FMNIST at training and evaluation times, and
on CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and SVHN, for 7 iterations with
a step size of 2/255 at training time and 100 iterations with
the same step size at evaluation time.
Effectiveness and Efficiency
Robustness against SFA Table 1 lists the accuracies of
each method on test data perturbed by SFA and selected λ
and σ. In this table, Avg. denote robust accuracies against
SFA averaged over (l,m), and Min. denotes minimum accu-
racies among hyperparameters (l,m), i.e., robust accuracies
against optimized SFA. CLN denotes accuracies on clean
data. The λ and σ are selected so that Avg. would become the
highest. In Tab. 1, Absum and SNC are more robust against
SFA compared with WD and L1. Although SNC is more ro-
bust than Absum on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100, clean accu-
racies of SNC are less than those of Absum and the compu-
tation time of SNC is larger than that of Absum as discussed
below. In the appendix, we provide accuracies against each
(l,m) and the results in which λ and σ are selected so that
each of CLN and Min. would become highest.
Figure 4 shows the test accuracies of the methods on
MNIST and CIFAR10 perturbed by SFA against regulariza-
tion weights. In this figure, min and max denote the min-
imum and maximum test accuracies among (l,m), respec-
tively, and avg. denotes test accuracies averaged over (l,m).
All methods tend to increase their minimum accuracy (re-
sults of SFA with optimized (l,m)) according to the reg-
ularization weight. However, L1 and WD significantly de-
crease in accuracy when the regularization weight is higher
than 10−1. On the other hand, Absum with the high reg-
ularization weight does not decrease in accuracy. Figure 5
shows the lowest training loss 1N
∑
f in training on CI-
FAR10 against λ. WD and L1 with a large λ prevent mini-
mization of the training loss. On the other hand, Absum with
a large λ can decrease the training loss because the search
space of K(i)∈Rh×h has h2−1 dimensional space even if
g(K(i))=0. In conclusion, standard regularization methods
might not be effective in improving robustness against SFA
because the high regularization weight imposes too tight of
constraints to minimize the loss function. On the other hand,
Absum imposes looser constraints; thus, we can improve ro-
bustness while maintaining classification performance. The
results of other datasets are almost the same as Fig. 4 (in-
cluded in the appendix). We also provide figures showing
the accuracy and the training loss of SNC against σ in the
appendix.
Computational Cost To confirm the efficiency of Absum,
we evaluated the runtime for one epoch. We also evalu-
ated the runtime of the forward and backward processes
of ResNet-18 for one image when input size increases by
Table 1: Accuracies on datasets perturbed by SFA.
Avg. Min. CLN λ and σ
Absum WD L1 SNC Absum WD L1 SNC Absum WD L1 SNC Absum WD L1 SNC
MNIST 98.64 98.59 98.48 98.55 94.76 86.84 78.01 91.79 99.14 99.10 99.18 99.10 10−2 10−3 10−4 10
FMNIST 83.11 83.09 82.49 82.60 60.12 47.57 58.38 55.36 88.46 86.99 87.05 87.50 10−3 10−2 10−3 10
CIFAR10 79.05 69.09 66.44 85.57 53.90 11.44 15.64 73.99 89.69 94.73 93.41 88.37 10−1 10−4 10−6 0.5
CIFAR100 48.69 42.97 38.99 60.42 16.32 5.23 9.84 45.05 68.72 67.05 71.68 62.76 10−3 10−6 10−7 1
SVHN 93.34 91.74 91.14 93.20 73.69 60.36 57.52 62.90 95.93 96.37 96.20 95.42 10−3 10−3 10−7 0.1
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Figure 4: Accuracy on test datasets perturbed by SFA vs λ
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Figure 5: Training loss vs λ
using random synthetic three channels images whose sizes
were 32×32, 64×64, 128×128, 256×256, 512×512, and
1024×1024 with 10 random labels. The results are shown
in Fig. 6. As shown in Fig. 6 (a), Absum is about ten times
faster than SNC on 32 × 32 image datasets with ResNet18.
The runtime of SNC is comparable to those of other methods
on MNIST and FMNIST because we use only two convolu-
tion layers, and image sizes of these datasets are smaller than
other datasets. In Fig. 6 (b), the runtime of Absum does not
increase significantly compared with SNC and the increase
in the runtime of Absum is similar to those of standard reg-
ularization methods. This is because the computational cost
of Absum does not depend on the size of input images. Since
SNC incurs large computational cost and depends on the in-
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Figure 6: Computation time
Table 2: Robust accuracy against transferred PGD attacks.
Results of other ε are shown in the appendix. w/o Reg. de-
notes results of training without regularization.
Absum WD L1 SNC w/o Reg.
MNIST (ε=0.2) 76.34 48.94 66.48 71.30 65.87
FMNIST (ε=0.2) 30.08 3.46 18.35 21.31 19.74
CIFAR10 (ε=4/255) 26.29 18.48 15.66 48.85 15.85
CIFAR100 (ε=4/255) 18.57 17.40 16.68 36.57 16.68
SVHN (ε=4/255) 49.11 40.49 52.79 46.36 54.39
put size, we could not evaluate the runtime when the image
width is larger than 256.
Extensive Empirical Investigation
Robustness against Transferred Attacks Sensitivity to
SFA is caused by convolution operation and is universal for
CNNs. This sensitivity might be a cause of transferability
of adversarial attacks, and robust CNNs against SFA can be
robust against transferred attacks. To confirm this hypothe-
sis, we investigate sensitivity to transferred PGD. We gen-
erate adversarial examples by using the substitute models
that were trained under the same setting as that presented
in the previous section but with different random initial-
izations. We used these substitute models rather than com-
pletely different models because they can be regarded as one
of the worst-case instances for transferred attacks (Madry et
al. 2018). The accuracies on these adversarial examples are
listed in Tab. 2. Absum and SNC improve robustness com-
pared to WD andL1. Tables 1 and 2 imply that the method of
improving robustness against SFA can also improve robust-
ness against the transferred attacks. This is the first study
that shows the relation between robustness against SFA and
against transferred white-box attacks.
Absum WD L1 SNC
0.0
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Figure 7: Power spectra of PGD perturbations on CIFAR10.
Magnitudes in low-frequency and high-frequency domains
are located near center and edge of each figure, respectively.
They are normalized as in (0, 1) after logarithmic transform.
Table 3: Robust accuracy against High-Frequency attacks.
Absum WD L1 SNC w/o Reg.
MNIST 99.00 98.98 99.10 98.97 99.01
FMNIST 84.15 83.91 82.56 84.30 84.03
CIFAR10 64.51 52.82 47.01 82.11 47.46
CIFAR100 41.44 36.15 31.53 61.22 31.80
SVHN 52.95 28.11 17.03 18.75 11.13
Sensitivity in Frequency Domain Several studies show
that CNNs are sensitive to high-frequency noise unlike hu-
man visual systems since CNNs are biased towards high-
frequency information (Wang et al. 2019; Yin et al. 2019).
From the robustness against SFA, which is regarded as
single-frequency noise, Absum and SNC can be expected
not to bias CNNs towards high-frequency information. To
confirm this hypothesis, we first investigate the power spec-
tra of adversarial perturbations of models trained using
each method. Next, we investigate robustness against High-
Frequency attacks, which remove high-frequency compo-
nents of image data. High-Frequency attacks have a hyper-
parameter of radius that determines the cutoff frequency, and
we set it as half the image width. In these experiments, λ and
σ are the same as those in Tab. 1.
Figure 7 shows the power spectra of PGD perturbations
on CIFAR10 and Tab. 3 lists the accuracies on the test data
processed by High-Frequency attacks. In Fig. 7, we shift
low frequency components to the center of the spectrum and
power spectra are averaged over test data and RGB chan-
nels. This figure shows that vulnerabilities of WD and L1
are biased in the high-frequency domain, while vulnerability
of SNC is highly biased in the low-frequency domain. The
power spectrum of Absum is not biased towards a specific
frequency domain. Due to these characteristics, SNC and
Absum are more robust against High-Frequency attacks than
WD and L1 (Tab. 3). Since human visual systems can per-
ceive low-frequency noise better than high-frequency noise,
attacks for Absum and SNC might be more perceptible than
attacks for WD and L1. Note that Absum is more robust
against high-pass filtering than SNC, which is presented in
the appendix. This result supports that Absum does not bias
CNNs towards a specific frequency domain while SNC bi-
ases CNNs towards the low-frequency domain.
Robustness against PGD with Adversarial Training Ta-
ble 4 lists the accuracies of models trained by adversarial
training on data perturbed by PGD. When using adversarial
Table 4: Accuracies (%) on test datasets perturbed by PGD.
MNIST Adversarial training
ε 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
Absum λ = 10−3 96.01 94.92 93.75 92.73 91.59 90.78
WD λ = 10−4 92.97 91.34 89.69 88.02 87.05 85.96
L1 λ = 10−4 93.12 91.86 90.60 89.28 88.25 87.06
SNC σ = 10 91.92 89.43 86.77 83.89 80.24 76.92
w/o Reg. 91.57 89.85 88.43 86.87 85.76 84.86
FMNIST Adversarial training
Absum λ = 10−3 66.94 65.92 65.77 65.52 65.24 64.95
WD λ = 10−5 65.38 63.64 62.91 62.60 62.11 61.96
L1 λ = 10−6 66.13 64.16 62.95 62.23 61.64 61.66
SNC σ = 10 51.58 49.33 47.31 45.85 44.86 44.04
w/o Reg. 63.36 61.66 61.15 60.97 60.46 60.26
CIFAR10 Adversarial training
ε 4/255 8/255 12/255 16/255 20/255
Absum λ = 10−5 69.42 49.39 30.22 15.03 6.54
WD λ = 10−5 69.48 49.38 29.37 14.45 6.06
L1 λ = 10−5 68.99 49.45 29.51 14.68 6.31
SNC σ = 10 68.47 48.74 29.07 14.32 6.04
w/o Reg. 68.46 48.77 29.20 14.50 6.08
CIFAR100 Adversarial training
Absum λ = 10−4 42.19 27.25 15.89 8.47 4.14
WD λ = 10−7 41.14 27.05 15.90 8.26 4.28
L1 λ = 10−4 40.75 26.14 14.45 7.61 3.67
SNC σ = 10 40.90 26.61 15.53 8.32 4.13
w/o Reg. 40.70 26.24 14.85 7.94 3.86
SVHN Adversarial training
Absum λ = 10−5 77.78 52.74 27.39 11.97 5.50
WD λ = 10−7 76.66 50.40 25.05 10.86 5.04
L1 λ = 10−6 76.50 51.49 27.10 12.12 5.63
SNC σ = 1.0 77.23 50.80 25.24 11.04 5.03
w/o Reg. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
training, Absum improves robustness against PGD, the high-
est among regularization methods, on almost all datasets.
This implies that sensitivity to SFA is one of the causes
of vulnerabilities of CNNs. The λ of Absum tends to be
higher than the λ of WD and L1; thus, Absum can also im-
prove robustness against PGD without deteriorating classi-
fication performance due to its looseness. Note that Absum
does not improve robustness against PGD whithout adver-
sarial training since the structural sensitivity of CNNs does
not necessarily cause all vulnerabilities of CNN-based mod-
els (we discussed this in the appendix). Even so, Absum is
more effective than other standard regularizations since it
can efficiently improve robustness against black-box attacks
(SFA, transferred attacks, and High-Frequency attacks) and
enhance adversarial training, as mentioned above.
Conclusion
We proposed Absum; an efficient defense method against
SFA that can reduce the structural sensitivity of CNNs with
ReLUs while its computational cost remains comparable to
standard regularizations. By reducing the structural sensitiv-
ity, Absum can improve robustness against not only SFA,
but also transferred PGD, and High-Frequency attacks. Due
to its simplicity, Absum can be used with other methods, and
Absum can enhance adversarial training of PGD.
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Appendix
Proofs of Lemmas
In this section, we provide the proofs of the lemmas.
Lemma 3. If k¯ = [k¯1, . . . , k¯n¯]T ∈ Rn¯, g(k¯) = |
∑n¯
i k¯i| is
a convex function.
Proof. If g(·) is a convex function, we have g(tx + (1 −
t)y) ≤ tg(x) + (1 − t)g(y), where t ∈ [0, 1] and ∀x,y ∈
Rn¯. Therefore, we investigate J = tg(x) + (1 − t)g(y) −
g(tx + (1 − t)y), and if J ≥ 0, we prove the lemma. We
have
J =t|∑i xi|+ (1− t)|∑i yi| − |∑i(txi + (1− t)yi)|,
=|t∑i xi|+ |(1− t)∑i yi| − |t∑i xi + (1− t)∑i yi|,
(17)
since t ≥ 0 and 1 − t ≥ 0. Let α = t∑i xi and β =
(1− t)∑i yi; thus, we have
J =|α|+ |β| − |α+ β|. (18)
From the triangle inequality, we have J ≥ 0; thus, this com-
pletes the proof.
Lemma 4. If k¯ = [k¯1, . . . , k¯n¯]T ∈ Rn¯, u ∈ Rn¯ and
g(k¯) = |∑n¯i k¯i|, we have
proxλg(k¯) =arg minu
1
2 ||u− k¯||22 + λ|
∑n¯
i ui| (19)
=

k¯ + λ1 if
∑n¯
i k¯i < −n¯λ,
k¯ −
∑n¯
i ki
n¯ 1 if − n¯λ ≤
∑n¯
i k¯i ≤ n¯λ,
k¯ − λ1 if ∑n¯i k¯i > n¯λ.
(20)
Proof. For clarity, let J = 12 ||u − k¯||22 + λ|
∑n¯
i ui|. We
have three cases; (a)
∑n¯
i ui > 0, (b)
∑n¯
i ui < 0, and
(c)
∑n¯
i ui = 0. In (a), we have |
∑n¯
i ui| =
∑n¯
i ui, and
∂J
∂ui
= ui − k¯i + λ = 0 at the optimal point. Therefore,
ui = k¯i − λ, and the solution becomes u = k¯ − λ1. The
condition is
∑n¯
i ui =
∑n¯
i k¯i − n¯λ > 0, i.e.,
∑n¯
i k¯i > n¯λ.
In (b), we have |∑n¯i ui| = −∑n¯i ui, and we can opti-
mize J = 12 ||u − k¯||22 − λ
∑n¯
i ui in the same manner as
(a). As a result, u = k¯ + λ1 if
∑n¯
i k¯i < −n¯λ. In (c),
|∑n¯i ui| is non-differentiable, but we can use subgradient
v such as |∑n¯i zi| ≥ |∑n¯i ui| + vT (z − u). Let B be
B = {u ± rei|i = 1, . . . , n} where small r > 0 and ek be
the standard basis; thus, we have M = maxz∈B |
∑
i zi| =|∑i ui ± r| = r when |∑i ui| = 0. As a result, v is
bounded as ||v||∞ ≤ M−|
∑
i ui|
r = 1. We then have
∂J
∂ui
=
ui − k¯i + λvi = 0; thus, u = k¯ − λv. Since ||v||∞ ≤ 1,
we have−n¯λ ≤ λ∑ vi ≤ n¯λ. Thus, the condition becomes
−n¯λ ≤ ∑i k¯i ≤ n¯λ since ∑i ui = ∑i k¯i + λ∑i vi = 0.
By substituting u = k¯ − λv into J , we have J = 12 ||λv||22
subject to
∑
i vi =
∑
i ki
λ and ||v||∞ ≤ 1. Thus, the min-
imum point is v1 = v2 = · · · = vn¯ =
∑
i ki
n¯λ , i.e.,
v =
∑
i ki
n¯λ 1. Therefore, u = k¯ −
∑
i ki
n¯ 1 is the mini-
mum point when −n¯λ ≤ ∑i k¯i ≤ n¯λ. This completes the
proof.
Inequality of Induced Norms for Convolution
The u+n(v−1)-th singular value of a doubly circulant ma-
trix A can be written as σu,v = |
∑
l,m kl,mexp(j
2pi
n (ul +
vm))| (not arranged in descending order), and we have
||A||2 = maxu,v σu,v ≤
∑
l,m |kl,m| ≤ ||A||∞. Therefore,
the spectral norm ofA is bounded above by the induced∞-
norm as ||A||2≤||A||∞.
L2 Regularization and Induced Norm
In this section, we explain that L2 regularization (weight de-
cay: WD) can constrain the induced norm of a convolutional
layer. The L2 regularization term of the convolution filter
K ∈ Rn×n is ∑n
l
∑n
m k
2
l,m. (21)
On the other hand, the square of the Frobenius norm of A
becomes
||A||2F =
∑n2
l
∑n2
m A
2
l,m = n
2
∑n
l
∑n
m k
2
l,m. (22)
Therefore, if we use the L2 regularization, we constrain the
Frobenius norm ofA. In addition, letM bem×mmatrices,
we have the following inequalities:
||M ||2 ≤ ||M ||F , (23)
||M ||∞√
m
≤ ||M ||2 ≤
√
m||M ||∞, (24)
where || · ||2 is the induced 2-norm, which is the largest sin-
gular value. From the above inequalities, we have ||A||∞n ≤||A||2 ≤ ||A||F , and thus, if we decrease the Frobenius
norm of A, the induced 2-norm and ∞-norms are also de-
creased.
Algorithm of Absum
Algorithm 1 shows the whole training algorithm of Absum.
First, we update parameters by SGD (lines 3 and 4). Next,
we apply the proximal operator to each convolution filter
(lines 5-13). These processes are iteratively performed.
Related Work
Adversarial attacks are divided into two types; white-
box and black-box attacks. The fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) and PGD are popular as simple and sophisticated
white-box attacks, respectively (Goodfellow, Shlens, and
Szegedy 2014; Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016;
Madry et al. 2018). Though many defense methods against
white-box attacks have been proposed, e.g., defensive distil-
lation (Papernot et al. 2016) and stochastic defense (Dhillon
et al. 2018), several methods have been toppled by strong
attacks (Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018; Carlini and
Wagner 2017). A promising method is adversarial training
(Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014; Kurakin, Goodfel-
low, and Bengio 2016; Madry et al. 2018), which uses ad-
versarial examples as training data. However, its computa-
tional cost is larger than naive training. Note that Absum
can be used with adversarial training and enhances it, as dis-
cussed in experiments. Black-box attacks are more practi-
cal than white-box attacks since it is difficult to access the
Algorithm 1 Training with Absum
1: Initialize parameters θ
2: while e ≤ E do
3: Sample a minibatch {(Xi,Yi)}B
4: θ ← θ − η∇θ 1B
∑B
b f(θ,Xb,Yb)
5: for i ∈ 1, . . . , L do
6: if
∑h
l
∑h
m k
(i)
l,m < −h2ηλ then
7: k¯(i) + ηλ1
8: else if −h2ηλ ≤∑hl ∑hm k(i)l,m ≤ h2ηλ then
9: k¯(i) −
∑h
l
∑h
m k
(i)
l,m
h2 1
10: else {∑hl ∑hm k(i)l,m > h2ηλ}
11: k¯(i) − ηλ1
12: end if
13: end for
14: e = e+ 1
15: end while
target models in online applications (Papernot et al. 2017;
Yuan et al. 2019). Most black-box attacks are transferred
white-box attacks and can be defended against by adver-
sarial training (Papernot et al. 2017). Several black-box at-
tacks use queries that ask the target model about the pre-
dicted labels of given input data, but these attacks might still
be impractical since they require a large amount of queries
(Brendel, Rauber, and Bethge 2018; Chen et al. 2017;
Ilyas et al. 2018). On the other hand, SFA only uses the in-
formation that the target model is composed of CNNs and is
more practical.
An early study (Szegedy et al. 2013) showed that the
induced norm can be a measure of robustness, and Parse-
val networks constrain the induced norm of linear layers to
improve robustness (Cisse et al. 2017). Parseval networks
are more robust against FGSM than naive models and can
enhance adversarial training. However, the computational
cost of Parseval networks is larger than standard regular-
ization methods. In addition, its robustness might be less
than that of the spectral norm regularization (Tsuzuku, Sato,
and Sugiyama 2018) though Parseval networks penalize the
spectral norm like the spectral norm constraint. The spec-
tral norm regularization can improve generalization perfor-
mance (Yoshida and Miyato 2017). However, the spectral
norm in spectral norm regularization is often quite different
from that of A (Gouk et al. 2018; Sedghi, Gupta, and Long
2019) for convolution.
As simple regularization methods, Srivastava et al. (2014)
shows that maxnorm regularization can improve generaliza-
tion performance of deep learning. The maxnorm regular-
ization in (Srivastava et al. 2014) restricts the L2 norm of
weight vectors to be strictly less than or equal to a thresh-
old c as ||Ai||2 ≤ c where Ai is the i-th row vector of A
in eq. (5). Therefore, the maxnorm regularization on convo-
lution is ||Ai||2 =
√∑
l
∑
m k
2
l,m ≤ c and is similar to L2
regularization. In fact, we observed that the effectiveness of
maxnorm regularization is similar to weight decay.
Experimental Conditions
We had roughly two experimental conditions according to
the dataset. In all experiments, we selected the best regular-
ization weight from among [101, 100, . . . , 10−6, 10−7] for
Absum and standard regularization methods and selected the
best spectral norm σ from among [0.01, 0.1, 0.5, 1.0, 10] for
spectral norm constraint (SNC) (Sedghi, Gupta, and Long
2019). In SNC, we clipped singular values once in 100 iter-
ations due to the large computational cost. Our experiments
ran once for each hyperparameter. We assumed that all im-
ages were divided by 255 and pixels had the values between
0 and 1. In addition, MNIST, CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 were
standardized as (mean, standard deviation)=(0,1) before the
images were applied to the models as preprocessing. In the
evaluation of robustness, we standardized input images by
using the means and standard deviations of clean data after
adversarial perturbation. The computation graph of the stan-
dardization was preserved in gradient-based attacks; thus,
perturbations of PGD were optimized while considering this
preprocess.
MNIST and Fashion-MNIST
The training set of each dataset contains 60,000 examples,
and the test set contains 10,000 examples (LeCun et al. 1998;
Xiao, Rasul, and Vollgraf 2017). For MNIST and Fashion-
MNIST (FMNIST), we stacked two convolutional layers
and two fully connected layers, the first convolutional layer
had the 10 output channels and the second convolutional
layer had 20 output channels. The kernel sizes of the con-
volutional layers were 5, their strides were 1, and we did
not use zero-padding in these layers. After each convolu-
tional layer, we applied max pooling (the stride was 2) and
ReLU activation. The output of the second convolutional
layer was applied to the first fully connected layer (the size
was 320 × 50), and we used the ReLU activation after the
first fully connected layer. The size of the second fully con-
nected layer was 50×10, and we used softmax as the output
function. After the second convolution layer and before the
second fully connected layer, we applied 50 % dropout. We
trained the model for 100 epochs by using Momentum SGD
(the learning rate of 0.01 and momentum of 0.5). We set the
minibatch size to 64.
We changed (l,m) to {(0, 0), (0, 1), . . . , (27, 26),
(27, 27)} in SFA since the size of the images was 28 × 28
and evaluated the accuracy of the model on the test data per-
turbed by SFA. The L∞ norm of the perturbation of SFA
was set to 80/255. The perturbed inputs were clipped so that
each element would be included in [0, 1]. For fair compari-
son, all regularization methods were applied to only convo-
lution filter parameters.
CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and SVHN
CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 contain 50,000 training images
and 10,000 test images (Krizhevsky and Hinton 2009).
SVHN contains 73,257 images for training and 26,032 im-
ages for testing (Netzer et al. 2011). For SVHN, we used
cropped digits, which were cropped as 32 × 32. The model
architecture was ResNet-18 for CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and
SVHN (He et al. 2016).4 As the preprocessing for train-
ing, given images were randomly cropped as 32 × 32 af-
ter padding a sequence of four on each border of the im-
ages. Horizontal flip was randomly applied to images with a
probability of 0.5. We trained the model for 350 epochs with
Momentum SGD (momentum 0.9). The initial learning rate
was set to 0.1, and after 150 and 250 epochs, we divided the
learning rate by 10. We set the minibatch size to 128.
We changed (l,m) in SFA to
{(0, 0), (0, 1), . . . , (31, 30), (31, 31)} since the size of
the images was 32 × 32 and evaluated the accuracy of the
model on the test data perturbed by SFA. The L∞ norm of
the perturbation of SFA was set to 10/255. The perturbed
inputs were clipped so that each element would be included
in [0, 1]. For fair comparison, all regularization methods
were applied to only convolution filter parameters.
Note that about 20 % of SVHN test and train datasets have
the class label of ‘1’. Due to the class imbalance, models
output class ‘1’ regardless of input images in some hyper-
parameter settings. In this case, the robust accuracies are al-
ways about 20%; thus, these models sometimes outperform
properly trained models with naive training in terms of ro-
bust accuracy. However, these results are not meaningful,
and we do not list them in the tables. For the other datasets,
we also do not list the results of the models that output one
class regardless of input images.
High-Frequency Attack
To evaluate robustness in the frequency domain, we used
High-Frequency attacks. High-Frequency attacks can be re-
garded as low-pass filteres, which remove high-frequency
components. In High-Frequency attacks (Wang et al. 2019),
we first apply discrete Fourier transform (DFT) F to dataX
as
Z = F(X). (25)
Next, we decompose the low- and high-frequency compo-
nents as
Zli,j =
{
Zi,j if d((i, j), (ci, cj)) ≤ r
0 otherwise
, (26)
Zhi,j =
{
0 if d((i, j), (ci, cj)) ≤ r
Zi,j otherwise
, (27)
where Zli,j and Z
h
i,j are elements of low- and high-frequency
components in the frequency domain, respectively, (ci, cj) is
a centroid of the image, d(·, ·) is the Euclidean distance, and
r is a radius that determines the cutoff frequency. Finally, we
apply the inverse DFT to Zl as
X l = F−1(Zl), (28)
and X l is an input image attacked by High-Frequency at-
tacks. While r is gradually reduced and accuracies are iter-
atively evaluated for each r in (Wang et al. 2019), we used
fixed r as half of the image width since we just focus on
comparing Absum with other methods.
4Our training settings are based on the open source of
https://github.com/kuangliu/pytorch-cifar.
In addition to High-Frequency attacks, we evaluated ro-
bust accuracies against high-pass filter Xh = F−1(Zh).
Note that images processed by the high-pass filter are not
adversarial examples since it is difficult for humans to accu-
rately classify these images. Even so, this experiment reveals
how the model trained using each method is biased towards
the low-frequency components.
Computational Cost
We evaluated the computation time of Absum. We used one
NVIDIA Tesla V100 GPU and 32 Intel(R) Xeon(R) Silver
4110 CPUs, and our implementation used Python 3.6.8, py-
torch 0.4.1, CUDA 9.0, and numpy 1.11.3 in this experi-
ment. Note that we used numpy to compute the FFT and
singular value decomposition, which is difficult to paral-
lelize, in SNC. We clipped singular values once in 100 it-
erations due to the large computational cost. The model ar-
chitectures and training process were the same as those of
the experiments involving SFA. We used λ = 10−4 and
σ = 1.0. We also conducted an experiment to evaluate
the computational time when the input size increases. We
generated random images whose sizes were 3 × 32 × 32,
3× 64× 64, 3× 128× 128, 3× 256× 256, 3× 512× 512,
and 3× 1024× 1024 with ten random labels, and evaluated
the computation time of the forward and backward processes
of ResNet18 for one image.
Robustness against PGD
We also evaluated the effectiveness of Absum against PGD.
We evaluated Absum with adversarial training (Madry et al.
2018) in addition to naive training because Absum and other
regularization methods can be used with adversarial training.
In these experiments, we used advertorch (Ding, Wang, and
Jin 2019) to generate adversarial examples of PGD.
Model architectures and training conditions were almost
the same as the experiments of SFA. The number of epochs
for MNIST and FMNIST was set to 100. On the other hand,
we observed overfitting in the adversarial training on CI-
FAR10, CIFAR100, and SVHN. Therefore, we trained the
model for 150 epochs with Momentum SGD (momentum
0.9). The initial learning rate was set to 0.1, and after 50
and 100 epochs, we divided the learning rate by 10. We
also applied weight decay of 10−4 to all parameters on CI-
FAR10 and CIFAR100 in the adversarial training of PGD
since overfitting easily occurred in adversarial training on
these datasets.
In PGD, the L∞ norm of the perturbation ε was set to
ε = [0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.4] for MNIST and FM-
NIST, and ε = [4/255, 8/255, 12/255, 16/255, 20/255] for
CIFAR10 at evaluation time. For PGD, we updated the per-
turbation for 40 iterations with a step size of 0.01 on MNIST
and FMNIST at training and evaluation times. On CIFAR10,
CIFAR100, and SVHN, we updated the perturbation for 7 it-
erations with a step size of 2/255 at training time and 100 it-
erations at evaluation time. The starting points of PGD were
randomly initialized from a uniform distribution of [-2/255,
2/255]. For adversarial training, we used training data per-
turbed by PGD with ε = 0.3 on MNIST and ε = 8/255
on CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and SVHN. In adversarial train-
ing, we only used adversarial examples of training data. The
above conditions are based on (Madry et al. 2018).
Additional Experimental Results
Robustness against SFA
Figure 8 shows the accuracies on datasets perturbed by SFA
against hyperparameters (l,m) of SFA. As shown in Fig. 8,
the models trained with WD and L1 regularization are sen-
sitive to certain frequency noise (e.g., (17, 17) in Figs. 8 (j)
and (k)). Table 5 lists the average, minimum, and clean ac-
curacies on datasets perturbed by SFA. In this table, Avg.
denotes accuracies on data perturbed by SFA averaged over
hyperparameters (l,m), and Min. denotes minimum accura-
cies on data perturbed by SFA among (l,m). CLN denotes
accuracies on clean data. The λ and σ are selected for each
of Avg., Min., and CLN so that each of them would become
the highest.
Figure 9 shows the accuracies of the methods on FM-
NIST, CIFAR100, and SVHN perturbed by SFA against reg-
ularization weights. These results are almost the same as
those of MNIST and CIFAR 10. On all the datasets, Ab-
sum improves the avg. and min. accuracies according to the
regularization weights, while the other methods decrease the
accuracies according to them.
Figure 10 shows the accuracies of SNC on all datasets
perturbed by SFA against the threshold of the spectral norm
σ. We can see that, on MNIST and FMNIST, accuracies in-
crease along with σ. This is because, when the spectral norm
is small, gradient vanishing occurs in the stacked convolu-
tional layers. On the other hand, on CIFAR10, CIFAR100,
and SVHN, where we used ResNet, minimum accuracy de-
creases, when the spectral norm becomes larger than a cer-
tain point, while max accuracy increases along with the
spectral norm. Figure 11 shows the lowest training loss 1N f
in training with SNC on CIFAR10 against σ. We can see that
SNC with low σ prevents the minimizing of the loss func-
tion.
Robustness against Transferred PGD
Table 6 lists robust accuracies against transferred PGD for
various ε. We can see that Absum and SNC can improve
robustness against transferred PGD better than WD and L1.
Accuracy on Data Filtered using High-pass Filter
Table 7 lists accuracies on test data processed using the high-
pass filter. As shown in this table, the accuracies of Ab-
sum tend to be higher than the other methods. This table
and results against High-Frequency attacks imply that Ab-
sum does not bias towards a specific frequency domain. On
the other hand, the models trained using SNC are not more
robust against the high-pass filter than WD and L1 while
they are more robust against High-Frequency attacks. There-
fore, SNC biases CNNs towards low-frequency components
of image data.
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Figure 8: Accuracies of methods on MNIST (a)-(d), FMNIST (e)-(h), CIFAR10 (i)-(l), CIFAR100 (m)-(p), and SVHN (q)-(t)
perturbed by SFA (l,m). CLN is accuracy on clean data. λ and σ are selected so that average accuracies (Avg) against SFA
would achieve largest values.
Table 5: Accuracies of each method on datasets perturbed by SFA (l,m). λ and σ are selected so that each accuracy would be
highest.
Avg. Min. CLN
Absum WD L1 SNC w/o Reg. Absum WD L1 SNC w/o Reg. Absum WD L1 SNC w/o Reg.
MNIST 98.64 98.59 98.48 98.55 98.44 95.25 94.65 91.61 91.79 80.53 99.23 99.21 99.19 99.10 99.18
FMNIST 83.11 83.09 82.49 82.60 72.75 60.12 53.25 58.38 55.36 42.92 89.25 89.20 89.27 87.50 89.37
CIFAR10 79.05 69.09 66.44 85.57 66.64 53.90 20.80 29.82 73.99 11.74 93.87 94.73 93.78 93.51 93.53
CIFAR100 48.69 42.97 38.99 60.42 39.52 19.94 10.67 12.31 45.58 8.89 72.38 74.63 73.02 71.51 71.93
SVHN 93.34 91.74 91.14 93.20 90.72 74.83 70.77 60.70 70.66 58.48 96.27 96.72 96.20 96.15 96.17
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Figure 9: Accuracies of methods on dataset perturbed by
SFA vs regularization weight
Computational Cost
We evaluated the computation time for convergence on CI-
FAR10. Figure 12 shows the training loss 1N f against com-
putation time when λ = 10−4 and σ = 1.0. In this figure,
Absum converges as fast as L1 regularization.
Robustness against PGD
Table 8 lists the test accuracies of the models trained by
naive training and adversarial training on the data perturbed
by PGD. We can see that when we train the models without
using adversarial training, Absum does not improve robust-
ness against PGD. This implies that the structural sensitiv-
ity of CNNs does not necessarily cause all vulnerabilities
of CNN-based models. However, when we use adversarial
training, Absum improves robustness against PGD, the high-
est among regularization methods on almost all datasets.
Therefore, robustness against Fourier basis functions can
contribute to robustness against other adversarial attacks. We
can see that SNC can slightly improve the robustness against
PGD in naive training. However, when using adversarial
training, it does not improve robustness more than Absum.
The best regularization weights for WD and L1 regulariza-
tion in adversarial training tend to be lower, and σ in adver-
sarial training is higher compared with naive training. These
results indicate that these methods impose too tight of con-
straints to achieve high accuracy and robustness at the same
time. On the other hand, the best regularization weights of
Absum in adversarial training tend to be higher than those in
naive training. Thus, Absum can improve robustness without
deteriorating classification performance due to its looseness.
Table 6: Accuracies (%) on test datasets perturbed by trans-
ferred PGD
MNIST
ε 0.10 0.20 0.30
Absum λ = 10−2 95.71 76.34 34.39
WD λ = 10−3 92.67 48.94 6.63
L1 λ = 10−4 94.63 66.48 23.30
SNC σ = 1.0 94.99 71.30 25.24
w/o Reg. 94.68 65.87 25.54
FMNIST
Absum λ = 10−3 58.32 30.08 17.02
WD λ = 10−2 35.15 3.46 0.02
L1 λ = 10−3 48.47 18.35 7.08
SNC σ = 10 51.45 21.31 9.76
w/o Reg. 39.92 19.74 12.24
CIFAR10
ε 2/255 4/255 6/255
Absum λ = 10−1 63.33 26.29 8.58
WD λ = 10−4 57.45 18.48 5.01
L1 λ = 10−6 57.52 15.66 2.88
SNC σ = 0.5 74.14 48.85 24.31
w/o Reg. 57.64 15.85 3.15
CIFAR100
Absum λ = 10−3 41.64 18.57 8.20
WD λ = 10−6 42.91 17.40 6.86
L1 λ = 10−7 41.35 16.68 6.60
SNC σ = 1.0 50.96 36.57 23.90
w/o Reg. 41.59 16.68 7.28
SVHN
Absum λ = 10−3 78.37 49.11 30.27
WD λ = 10−3 76.20 40.49 20.19
L1 λ = 10−7 79.99 52.79 32.95
SNC σ = 1.0 77.70 46.36 25.78
w/o Reg. 80.75 54.39 34.17
Table 7: Robust accuracy against high-pass filter
Absum WD L1 SNC w/o Reg.
MNIST 13.21 40.07 46.96 32.96 27.30
FMNIST 29.75 10.08 10.00 10.05 10.04
CIFAR10 28.75 19.88 20.35 12.93 28.19
CIFAR100 4.03 2.17 1.80 1.1 2.66
SVHN 15.53 19.59 7.50 6.12 6.38
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Figure 10: Accuracies of methods on dataset perturbed by
SFA vs spectral norm σ in SNC
Table 8: Accuracies (%) on test datasets perturbed by PGD. Reg. denotes regularization.
MNIST Naive training Adversarial training
ε 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
Absum λ = 10−2 91.70 58.97 13.30 0.90 0.09 0.00 Absum λ = 10−3 96.01 94.92 93.75 92.73 91.59 90.78
WD λ = 10−5 93.38 73.97 34.34 6.55 0.71 0.04 WD λ = 10−4 92.97 91.34 89.69 88.02 87.05 85.96
L1 λ = 10−2 92.23 76.02 43.92 13.14 2.29 0.21 L1 λ = 10−4 93.12 91.86 90.60 89.28 88.25 87.06
SNC σ = 0.5 92.16 79.30 49.12 16.21 3.64 0.63 SNC σ = 10 91.92 89.43 86.77 83.89 80.24 76.92
w/o Reg. 93.21 73.81 33.26 6.07 0.70 0.04 w/o Reg. 91.57 89.85 88.43 86.87 85.76 84.86
FMNIST Naive training Adversarial training
Absum λ = 10−7 53.40 21.92 6.19 1.06 0.03 0.00 Absum λ = 10−3 66.94 65.92 65.77 65.52 65.24 64.95
WD λ = 10−2 54.45 26.12 8.93 2.19 0.38 0.01 WD λ = 10−5 65.38 63.64 62.91 62.60 62.11 61.96
L1 λ = 10−3 52.80 22.43 6.80 1.59 0.18 0.00 L1 λ = 10−6 66.13 64.16 62.95 62.23 61.64 61.66
SNC σ = 1.0 49.08 24.03 9.36 3.06 0.68 0.07 SNC σ = 10 51.58 49.33 47.31 45.85 44.86 44.04
w/o Reg. 52.75 20.97 5.79 0.98 0.05 0.0 w/o Reg. 63.36 61.66 61.15 60.97 60.46 60.26
CIFAR10 Naive training Adversarial training
ε 4/255 8/255 12/255 16/255 20/255 4/255 8/255 12/255 16/255 20/255
Absum λ = 10−7 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Absum λ = 10−5 69.42 49.39 30.22 15.03 6.54
WD λ = 10−2 8.42 1.87 0.37 0.09 0.02 WD λ = 10−5 69.48 49.38 29.37 14.45 6.06
L1 λ = 10−1 5.61 1.43 0.32 0.12 0.08 L1 λ = 10−5 68.99 49.45 29.51 14.68 6.31
SNC σ = 0.5 13.39 0.41 0.01 0.00 0.00 SNC σ = 10 68.47 48.74 29.07 14.32 6.04
w/o Reg. 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 w/o Reg. 68.46 48.77 29.20 14.50 6.08
CIFAR100 Naive training Adversarial training
Absum λ = 10−7 2.85 0.35 0.08 0.04 0.02 Absum λ = 10−4 42.19 27.25 15.89 8.47 4.14
WD λ = 10−4 4.61 1.08 0.37 0.19 0.14 WD λ = 10−7 41.14 27.05 15.90 8.26 4.28
L1 λ = 10−2 4.26 1.53 0.68 0.37 0.17 L1 λ = 10−4 40.75 26.14 14.45 7.61 3.67
SNC σ = 1.0 7.03 1.88 0.70 0.25 0.15 SNC σ = 10 40.90 26.61 15.53 8.32 4.13
w/o Reg. 2.02 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.01 w/o Reg. 40.03 25.42 13.94 7.34 3.68
SVHN Naive training Adversarial training
Absum λ = 10−7 9.36 0.33 0.02 0.00 0.00 Absum λ = 10−5 77.78 52.74 27.39 11.97 5.50
WD λ = 10−4 10.46 0.41 0.02 0.00 0.00 WD λ = 10−7 76.66 50.40 25.05 10.86 5.04
L1 λ = 10−5 11.78 0.565 0.03 0.00 0.00 L1 λ = 10−6 76.50 51.49 27.10 12.12 5.63
SNC σ = 0.5 22.34 2.32 0.21 0.02 0.00 SNC σ = 1.0 77.23 50.80 25.24 11.04 5.03
w/o Reg. 8.44 0.28 0.02 0.00 0.00 w/o Reg. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
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Figure 11: Training loss vs. σ on CIFAR10
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Figure 12: Training loss vs. computation time
